Deputized to Discriminate: The Dangerous Revival of ICE “Task Force” Agreements

Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, first implemented in 1996, authorizes local and state law enforcement agencies to enter into formal agreements with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).[1]  These agreements, known as Memoranda of Agreements (“MOAs”), deputize selected officers to perform certain federal immigration enforcement functions.[2]  There are two enforcement models: the jail enforcement model, in which officers identify individuals for ICE after an arrest, and the more controversial task force model, which allows officers to initiate immigration enforcement in the field—during traffic stops, patrols, or other community interactions.[3]  Once trained and certified by ICE, local officers can issue immigration detainers, collect biometric data, and initiate removal proceedings, often without a judicial warrant.[4]  Participation is voluntary, but ICE provides training, resources, and support, incentivizing cooperation even in jurisdictions with no history of immigration enforcement.[5]

The task force model has long been a source of legal and public controversy.[6]  In 2012, the Obama administration scaled back the task force model, citing its misuse in racially discriminatory practices and failure to address serious criminal threats.[7]  Dozens of MOAs were then terminated with ICE shifting its emphasis to jail-based enforcement,[8] and the task force approach resurfaced sporadically in other forms.[9]  In February 2025, the Trump administration revived the “task force model, reauthorizing field-level immigration enforcement in multiple jurisdictions.[10]  Supporters claim this enhances public safety by deporting dangerous individuals.[11]  But this revival is deeply problematic.  The task force model erodes trust between immigrant communities and law enforcement, risks repeating constitutional violations documented in prior iterations of the program, and exposes local governments to significant legal liability.[12] 

When local police officers are deputized to enforce federal immigration law, undocumented individuals and even lawful residents within mixed-status communities become reluctant to engage with law enforcement.[13]  For example, victims may hesitate to report crimes, witnesses may avoid cooperating with investigations, and families may forgo calling 911 during emergencies out of fear that contact with the police could lead to immigration consequences.[14]   The expanded discretion granted by the task force model opens the door to arbitrary and potentially discriminatory enforcement, as officers may target individuals based on perceived race, ethnicity, or language, rather than any underlying criminal behavior.[15]  As recently as 2022, an ACLU report found that “287(g) jurisdictions”—counties or localities participating in either version of the program—continued to disproportionately refer Latino residents to ICE for low-level offenses like driving without a license or a broken taillight.[16]  In such environments, trust between immigrant communities and local police erodes, weakening public safety for everyone—not just undocumented residents.[17]

The task force model also raise serious constitutional questions.  The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable seizures, including detention without probable cause or judicial authorization, yet in many 287(g) jurisdictions officers have detained individuals solely based on ICE detainers.[18]  In Morales v. Chadbourne, the First Circuit held that the government violated the Fourth Amendment when an American citizen was held for over twenty-four hours solely based on an ICE detainer.[19]  Similarly, federal courts across the country—including in California, Pennsylvania, and Florida—have found that detaining individuals based on civil immigration requests without probable cause is unconstitutional.[20]  The protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause are also at stake.  Government actors, including local police, are prohibited from treating individuals differently based on race, ethnicity, or national origin without a compelling justification.[21]  However, under task force MOAs, deputized officers disproportionately stop and question individuals based on race, language, or perceived immigration status.[22]  This pattern has persisted for years and shows no sign of stopping under the revived program.[23] 

287(g) jurisdictions also expose themselves to significant litigation and financial liability.[24]  Lawsuits over wrongful detention, racial profiling, or violations of due process can lead to costly judgments and settlements against localities.[25]  These risks are amplified by the fact that ICE provides minimal funding for training, oversight, or legal defense, leaving local governments and their taxpayers to bear the brunt of any litigation fallout.[26]  In essence, municipalities assume all the liability for carrying out a federal agenda.[27]  This dynamic was made clear in late 2018, when Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, ended its 287(g) partnership following growing concerns about due process violations and the chilling effect on community trust.[28]  Local officials cited the financial burden and political costs associated with continuing the agreement—including lawsuits and public protests—as key factors in their decision.[29]  Since then, dozens of other jurisdictions have similarly opted out, recognizing that entangling local police in immigration enforcement not only undermines public safety, but also opens the door to litigation, reputational damage, and budgetary strain.[30] 

As local governments weigh the risks—legal, financial, political, and moral—of participating in task force MOAs, the broader implications become clear.[31]  Trump’s revival of ICE’s task force model is a regressive and dangerous step backward for constitutional rights and public safety.  Deputizing local police to enforce civil immigration law does little to protect communities and much to divide them.[32]  As the federal government resurrects a program with a long history of abuse, local governments must resist.[33]  Policing should serve and protect—not profile and deport.  Anything less is not law enforcement—it is illegal discrimination.

[1] See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Iᴍᴍɪɢʀ. & Cᴜsᴛᴏᴍs Eɴғ’ᴛ (ICE), https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g (last visited Mar. 28, 2025) [https://perma.cc/34NC-UMMJ].

[2] Id.

[3] The “task force” program is known under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and eventually codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).

[4] See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).

[5] Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 1.

[6] Ana Ceballos, What’s the 287(g) Task Force Model? Your Guide to the Immigration Enforcement Program, Mɪᴀᴍɪ Hᴇʀᴀʟᴅ (Mar. 12, 2025), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article301915479.html [https://perma.cc/YY2M-78YT].

[7]  Id.

[8] Michele Waslin, ICE Scaling Back 287(g) Program, Iᴍᴍɪɢʀ. Iᴍᴘᴀᴄᴛ (Oct. 19, 2012), https://immigrationimpact.com/2012/10/19/ice-scaling-back-287g-program/ [https://perma.cc/72EE-E5KZ].

[9] Besides the Jail Enforcement Model, another model is the Warrant Service Officer (WSO) program launched in 2019. Under the WSO program, ICE trains, certifies, and authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to serve and execute administrative warrants on individuals in their custody. This model allows local officers to perform certain immigration enforcement functions within jails or correctional facilities but does not authorize them to interrogate individuals about their immigration status. The WSO program is considered a more limited delegation of authority compared to the original task force model. See Mohamed Al Elew and Wendy Fry, Here’s Every Local Police Agency Enforcing for ICE, Tʜᴇ Mᴀʀᴋᴜᴘ (Apr. 16, 2025) https://themarkup.org/tools/2025/04/16/law-enforcement-ice-cooperation-tracker [https://perma.cc/T3LF-Y9TP]. By December 2024, ICE had established 287(g) agreements with 135 state or local law enforcement agencies across 21 states, reflecting a significant increase in such partnerships. See also The 287(g) Program: An Overview, Aᴍ. Iᴍᴍɪɢʀ. Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ (Jan. 20, 2025), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-immigration [https://perma.cc/32NY-YPY2].

[10] Tim Henderson, ICE Lets Local Officials Stop Immigrants on the Streets as Task Force Program is Back, Sᴛᴀᴛᴇʟɪɴᴇ (Feb. 21, 2025), https://stateline.org/2025/02/21/ice-lets-local-officials-stop-immigrants-on-the-streets-as-task-force-program-is-back/ [https://perma.cc/H27K-C6UY].

[11] In Maryland, sheriffs from several counties have argued that ending the 287(g) program would compromise public safety and turn Maryland into a “sanctuary state.” See Joanna Putman, Md. Bill Would Ban 287(g) Partnerships between Local Police, ICE, Pᴏʟɪᴄᴇ1 (Mar. 28, 2025), https://www.police1.com/border-patrol/md-bill-would-ban-287g-partnerships-between-local-police-ice [https://perma.cc/H5AV-EV2E].

[12] See License to Abuse: How ICE’s 287(g) Program Empowers Racist Sheriffs and Civil Rights Violations, ACLU (Feb. 2022), https://assets.aclu.org/live/uploads/publications/2022-06-02-sheriffresearch_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZB9-NL9N]. See also New York Daily News Editorial Board, Nassau’s ICE Deal Is a Bad Call: No Gain to Use Local Cops for Immigration Duties, NY Dᴀɪʟʏ Nᴇᴡs (Mar. 20, 2025), https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/03/20/nassaus-ice-deal-is-a-bad-call/ [https://perma.cc/SUP7-8PWV].

[13] Danyelle Solomon, Tom Jawetz, and Sanam Malik, The Negative Consequences of Entangling Local Policing and Immigration Enforcement, Cᴛʀ ғᴏʀ Aᴍ. Pʀᴏɢʀᴇss (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/negative-consequences-entangling-local-policing-immigration-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/DNC8-MCYC].

[14] Id.

[15] See License to Abuse, supra note 12.

[16] Id.

[17] Meg Anderson, Police say ICE tactics are eroding public trust in local law enforcement, OPB (Mar. 30, 2025), https://www.opb.org/article/2025/03/30/trust-in-police-wanes-as-ice-immigration-enforcement-ramps-up/ [https://perma.cc/WBJ2-334A].

[18] ICE detainers are written requests asking local law enforcement to hold someone for up to 48 hours after their scheduled release so ICE can take custody. These detainers are not warrants and are often issued without judicial oversight. See License to Abuse, supra note 12 at 18.

[19] Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217–18 (2015).

[20] See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995 (C.D. Cal. 2019).

[21] City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985).

[22] License to Abuse, supra note 12 at 26-28.

[23] See The 287(g) Program: An Overview, supra note 9. (The report found that these programs foster environments that increase racial profiling by law enforcement agents, disproportionately impacting Latino and Black residents.). Damage had already been done in jurisdictions such as Maricopa County, Arizona, where Sheriff Joe Arpaio used his 287(g) authority to conduct traffic stops and workplace raids targeting Latino communities. Arpaio’s department was eventually sued by the DOJ for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Joe Arpaio, Wɪᴋɪᴘᴇᴅɪᴀ, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Arpaio (last visited Mar. 31, 2025) [https://perma.cc/BQK4-RMDY]; see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 994 (2012).

[24] Solomon, Jawetz, and Malik, supra note 13.

[25] For instance, in Florida, a sheriff's office settled a federal lawsuit after unlawfully detaining a lawful permanent resident and referring him to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This case underscores the potential for legal repercussions and financial burdens associated with the program. See Florida Sheriff’s Office Settles Lawsuit Over Illegal Detention of US Resident, SPLC (Mar. 10, 2023), https://www.splcenter.org/resources/stories/florida-sheriffs-settles-lawsuit-illegal-detention-resident/ [https://perma.cc/9JZP-GVY3].

[26] L.J. Wolfgang Keppley, 287(g) Agreements: A Costly Choice for Localities, Nɪsᴋᴀɴᴇɴ Cᴛʀ. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.niskanencenter.org/287g-agreements-a-costly-choice-for-localities/ [https://perma.cc/4HG6-LLV9].

[27] Keppley, supra note 26.

[28] Mecklenburg Co. Sheriff Announces End of 287(g) Program, ACLU ᴏғ Nᴏʀᴛʜ Cᴀʀᴏʟɪɴᴀ (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/en/press-releases/mecklenburg-co-sheriff-announces-end-287g-program [https://perma.cc/YZE2-8MAW].

[29] Mecklenburg Co. Sheriff Announces End of 287(g) Program, supra note 28.

[30] See Alissa Ellis & Chris Rickerd, North Carolinians Voted to End Cooperation With Trump’s Deportation Force. ICE Retaliated, ACLU (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/north-carolinians-voted-end-cooperation-trumps [https://perma.cc/RCD3-VJCL]. This move was part of a broader trend in North Carolina, where several newly elected sheriffs in counties like Wake, Durham, Forsyth, and Henderson also pledged to end their 287(g) agreements.

[31] License to Abuse, supra note 12.

[32] Meg Anderson, Police say ICE tactics are eroding public trust in local law enforcement, OPB (Mar. 30, 2025), https://www.opb.org/article/2025/03/30/trust-in-police-wanes-as-ice-immigration-enforcement-ramps-up/ [https://perma.cc/WBJ2-334A].

[33] License to Abuse, supra note 12.