The Future of Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Under the Trump Administration

The earnings of public sector employees trail behind those of their private sector counterparts, and this income disparity is continually increasing.[1]  Thus, the burden of repaying student loan debt weighs heavily on public servants.[2]  Lower earnings, and the resulting difficulty in repaying student loans, tend to dissuade individuals from pursuing or maintaining careers in public service, thereby leading to staffing shortages in essential workforce sectors, particularly since those positions often require highly educated candidates.[3]  In 2007, Congress sought to address these burdens by passing the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (“CCRAA”), which established the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”) Program.[4]  However, President Trump now aims to limit PSLF through an executive order which, despite appearing to merely prevent employees of organizations engaging in “illegal activities” from receiving loan forgiveness,[5] actually compromises congressional intent by excluding individuals who work for marginalized groups.[6]  Other governmental branches must resist caving to presidential pressure to ensure that these workers can continue serving the communities that rely on them without sacrificing their own livelihoods, regardless of the sitting president’s whims.

PSLF was designed to encourage individuals to pursue careers in public service by promising to forgive their outstanding student loan balances after they have worked for an eligible employer and made 120 consecutive monthly payments under an approved repayment plan.[7]  Yet, PSLF approval rates have been concerningly low ever since the first set of borrowers became eligible to apply for the program in 2017, with only 55 out of 19,321 applicants having actually received loan forgiveness by April 2018.[8]

The number of public service workers approved for PSLF has fluctuated in response to the ever-changing legal and political landscape in the United States,[9] illustrated in recent years by the Trump and Biden administrations’ differing approaches to PSLF.[10]  During his first term, President Trump sought to entirely dismantle PSLF by suggesting cuts to its funding in his 2018 through 2021 budget proposals.[11]  Accordingly, PSLF approval rates remained low, with approximately ninety-nine percent of applicants rejected in 2019.[12]  In contrast, the Biden administration expanded PSLF by broadening the scope of what constituted qualifying payments and reevaluating rejected applicants, leading the number of borrowers who received debt forgiveness under PSLF to increase from seven thousand to over one million.[13]

In his second term, President Trump has again sought to restrict which public service workers are eligible for loan forgiveness through PSLF.[14]  On March 7, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order directing the Secretary of Education to revise PSLF to exclude organizations engaging in activities deemed to have a “substantial illegal purpose.”[15]  This included, among others, employers fostering “illegal immigration” as well as “the chemical and surgical castration or mutilation of children or the trafficking of children to so-called transgender sanctuary States for purposes of emancipation from their lawful parents.”[16]  The severe nature of the executive order’s language belies the real individuals it aims to preclude from seeking loan forgiveness: immigration lawyers representing undocumented immigrants, advocates for LGBTQ+ (particularly transgender) youth, and more.[17]

The likelihood of the Trump administration succeeding in its attempt to restrict PSLF eligibility is limited by the extensive federal rulemaking process that would be necessary to revise the CCRAA, under which PSLF was created.[18]  As stated in the March 7, 2025 executive order, the Secretary of Education has ultimate discretion in developing changes to PSLF.[19]  Proposed amendments to federal rules must also generally be published in the Federal Register for public comment, allowing interested organizations and individuals—including those who would be affected by said amendments—to suggest improvements or recommend against the amendments’ issuance altogether.[20]  While the President does have the power to review the proposed changes before they are published in the Federal Register,[21] the Department of Education cannot base its final rules on any single voice.[22]  Thus, this process will likely act as a notable barrier against President Trump’s pressure on the Secretary of Education to implement his executive order if public opinion, expert guidance, and the Department of Education’s own rulemaking record recommend otherwise.[23]

Existing Supreme Court precedent also restricts the extent to which PSLF can be altered by any single government actor.[24]  In Biden v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that the Biden administration had overstepped its authority by announcing a $400 billion student loan cancellation plan, which the administration attempted to justify based on the Secretary of Education’s power to modify student loan programs during national emergencies under the HEROES Act.[25]  The Court invoked the “major questions doctrine,” requiring administrative agencies to obtain congressional authorization when making decisions with significant economic or political impact.[26]  While this decision was aimed at barring overexpansion of PSLF by the executive branch,[27] it could also have the opposite effect of preventing the Trump administration from precluding entire classes of public service workers from availing themselves of PSLF through the Court’s emphasis on debt forgiveness as an act of Congress, not the president.[28]  This possibility is bolstered by the general bipartisan support that PSLF has enjoyed for much of its history, which may encourage congressional pushback against presidential efforts to restrict or eliminate the program.[29]

Checks on presidential power by executive agencies, the legislature, the judiciary, and the public are key in safeguarding PSLF for current and future public servants.[30]  By resisting presidential pressure to restrict PSLF, these governmental actors can ensure that public servants can continue the crucial work they perform for disadvantaged groups without sacrificing their own livelihoods.

[1] Allison Maldonado, Z.W. Taylor, Patrick Ziegler, Elizabeth A. Rainey & Debra Carter, Public Service Loan Forgiveness: A Historical Overview and Practical Implications for Higher Education Practitioners, 30 Essᴀʏs ɪɴ Eᴅᴜ. 1, 2 (2024); Monique Morrissey & Jennifer Sherer, The Public-Sector Pay Gap is Widening. Unions Help Shrink It., Eᴄᴏɴ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ Iɴsᴛ. (Aug. 29, 2024), https://www.epi.org/publication/widening-public-sector-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/4EYT-2RVP].

[2] Maldonado, Taylor, Ziegler, Rainey & Carter, supra note 1; Morrissey & Sherer, supra note 1.

[3] Id.

[4] Maldonado, Taylor, Ziegler, Rainey & Carter, supra note 1.

[5] Restoring Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Tʜᴇ Wʜɪᴛᴇ Hᴏᴜsᴇ (Mar. 7, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/restoring-public-service-loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/YK5W-XN8Z].

[6] See Adam S. Minsky, What Trump’s New Student Loan Forgiveness Order Means for 3 Million Borrowers, Fᴏʀʙᴇs (Mar. 10, 2025, 10:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2025/03/10/what-trumps-new-student-loan-forgiveness-order-means-for-3-million-borrowers [https://perma.cc/GVK8-RMGA].

[7] Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF), 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2025); Restoring Public Service Loan Forgiveness, supra note 5; Maldonado, Taylor, Ziegler, Rainey & Carter, supra note 1.

[8] U.S. Gᴏᴠ’ᴛ Aᴄᴄᴏᴜɴᴛᴀʙɪʟɪᴛʏ Oғғ., GAO-18-547, Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴇʀᴠɪᴄᴇ Lᴏᴀɴ Fᴏʀɢɪᴠᴇɴᴇss: Eᴅᴜᴄᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Nᴇᴇᴅs ᴛᴏ Pʀᴏᴠɪᴅᴇ Bᴇᴛᴛᴇʀ Iɴғᴏʀᴍᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ғᴏʀ ᴛʜᴇ Lᴏᴀɴ Sᴇʀᴠɪᴄᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Bᴏʀʀᴏᴡᴇʀs (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-547 [https://perma.cc/B23V-9UU2]. The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) largely attributed low PSLF approval rates to the Department of Education’s failure to provide borrowers and loan servicers with clear and consistent guidance on PSLF requirements, particularly qualifying employers and payments. Id.

[9] Maldonado, Taylor, Ziegler, Rainey & Carter, supra note 1, at 2–3.

[10] Id. at 3–5.

[11] Id. at 3; Ron Lieber, What Will Trump Do With the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program?, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Nov. 14, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/14/business/trump-public-service-loan-forgiveness.html.

[12] Maldonado, Taylor, Ziegler, Rainey & Carter, supra note 1, at 4.

[13] Id. at 5; Akayla Gardner, Trump Restricts Loan Forgiveness for Nonprofit Workers, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ L. (Mar. 7, 2025, 9:22 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/immigration/trump-plans-to-restrict-loan-forgiveness-for-non-profit-workers [https://perma.cc/C85R-72TK]; Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restores Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Tʜᴇ Wʜɪᴛᴇ Hᴏᴜsᴇ (Mar. 7, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restores-public-service-loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/3DEZ-3N7J].

[14] Restoring Public Service Loan Forgiveness, supra note 5.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Minsky, supra note 6.

[18] Id.

[19] Restoring Public Service Loan Forgiveness, supra note 5.

[20] Oғғ. ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Fᴇᴅ. Rᴇɢ., A Gᴜɪᴅᴇ ᴛᴏ ᴛʜᴇ Rᴜʟᴇᴍᴀᴋɪɴɢ Pʀᴏᴄᴇss 3 (2013), https://uploads.federalregister.gov/uploads/2013/09/The-Rulemaking-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3KQ-NY8P].

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 6.

[23] Id.

[24] Maldonado, Taylor, Ziegler, Rainey & Carter, supra note 1, at 6.

[25] Id. at 5–6.

[26] Id. at 6.

[27] Id.; Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 503-504 (2023).

[28] Id. at 504 (“‘A decision of such magnitude and consequence’ on a matter of ‘earnest and profound debate across the country’ must ‘res[t] with Congress itself, or an agency acting pursuant to a clear delegation from that representative body.’” (quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 735)).

[29] Minsky, supra note 6.

[30] Id.