Equal Fine, Unequal Justice: Why Flat Fines Fail Deterrence and Punish Poverty

At what point do we admit that a one-size-fits-all punishment is not fairness, but abdication?  Flat-dollar fines impose identical penalties on people with radically different capacities to pay.^[1]  For the wealthy, a ticket is a mild annoyance.  For others, it is the difference between groceries and arrears.^[2]  Court debt is the hinge.  It is how small tickets become life-altering penalties through late fees, collections, and collateral consequences.^[3]  Because fines are meant to deter, identical dollar amounts can produce unequal deterrence, turning penalties into prices for the wealthy while turning poverty into a punishment multiplier.^[4] 

Constitutional doctrine has long warned against jailing or revoking liberty solely because someone is poor.^[5]  In Bearden v. Georgia, the Court held that a court may not revoke probation and imprison a person for failure to pay a fine or restitution without first inquiring into the reasons for nonpayment.^[6]  If the person has made bona fide efforts to pay but lacks the ability to do so, the court must consider adequate alternatives to incarceration before imposing custody.^[7] Bearden thus supplies a constitutional backstop against escalating liberty deprivations when nonpayment reflects inability: the state cannot treat poverty itself as the basis for escalating punishment.^[8] 

Flat fines and add-on fees, however, severely over-punish poverty.^[9]  The Washington Center for Equitable Growth explains how fines, fees, and mandatory surcharges can convert low-level violations into long-term court debt.^[10]  Late fees, collection costs, and collateral consequences can stack onto the original sanction.^[11]  For people who cannot pay, the amount stops functioning as a manageable charge and becomes escalating punishment.^[12]  By contrast, a fine becomes a price for the wealthy rather than a deterrent, starting with routine penalties like parking tickets.  For instance, during renovations to Jeff Bezos’s Washington, D.C. residence from 2016 to 2019, local reporting described 564 parking tickets totaling $16,840 that were paid as part of the project’s cost structure.^[13]  Rather than preventing illegal parking, the fines effectively operated as a price for continued noncompliance. 

When a penalty is negligible relative to resources, violations can be budgeted and repeated.  The same deterrence logic appears in other regulatory contexts.^[14]  For example, in environmental enforcement, firms may profit from noncompliance when penalties are lower than the gains from delaying compliance.^[15]  A recent analysis of Clean Air Act enforcement argues that, using the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) own economic methods, violating the Act remains profitable in a substantial share of cases even after paying fines, especially for larger violations.^[16]  When that is true, penalties function less like deterrence and more like a predictable cost of doing business.^[17]  As with individuals, the same nominal penalty can burden smaller firms more heavily relative to resources because they may struggle to absorb compliance costs or survive a single violation, while larger firms can price penalties into ordinary operations.^[18] 

The lesson from these examples is structural.  Flat-dollar penalties do not scale with capacity, so they predictably under-deter at the top and over-punish at the bottom.^[19]  For that reason, equal dollars do not produce equal justice, and the most direct way to repair unequal deterrence is to stop pretending that equal dollars equal justice.^[20]  One promising alternative is the day-fine model.  Courts separate offense seriousness from ability to pay by assigning offense-based “units” and multiplying by a daily income-based figure.^[21]  In this model, equal wrongdoing is punished with equal penal significance, not equal dollars.^[22]  The United States has tested this approach, and New York’s Staten Island day-fine pilot from 1988 to 1990 remains a leading U.S. experiment. ^[23]  A Vera Institute report explains how Staten Island’s day-fine pilot was administered and identifies a key constraint,^[24] namely that because New York’s statutory fine maximums were relatively low, courts sometimes had to reduce day-fine amounts for higher income offenders when the calculated fine exceeded the cap.^[25] 

Contemporary debates echo the same concern.^[26]  New York has pursued reforms aimed at reducing the punitive cascade tied to traffic-debt nonpayment.^[27]  Amendments enacted in 2021 eliminated certain license suspensions for traffic debt and made payment plans available, and the DMV provides guidance on those plans.^[28]  In 2023, a New York City Council proposal floated a pilot for means-based parking penalties, reflecting growing recognition that flat-dollar sanctions do not scale with capacity.^[29]  Taken together, these measures mark progress, but they do not fully solve the capacity problem.  The 2021 reforms reduce one of the most punitive downstream consequences—license suspension—but leave the underlying structure of surcharges, fees, and court debt largely intact.^[30]  Meanwhile, the 2023 proposal is only a limited pilot focused on a narrow set of violations and relies primarily on reported income, which can miss capacity held in assets and inherited wealth.^[31] 

Income-based penalties are a start, yet reported income is an imperfect proxy for capacity because wealth can be held in assets and inherited capital.^[32]  Reform should therefore incorporate simple wealth proxies such as asset bands, property indicators, or verified net resources so sanctions cannot be avoided by minimizing income while retaining wealth.^[33]  Reform must also guard against the opposite failure mode at the bottom of the distribution.  If sanctions are reduced to zero, the law can start to feel optional, but if the state insists on flat fines, it recreates the poverty cascade.  New York should adopt front-end ability to pay screening with presumptive indigency rules.^[34]  It should also use deterrence preserving alternatives such as modest minimum fines or a clear community service conversion schedule.  Finally, it should adopt a firm rule against escalation when nonpayment is due to inability.^[35]  

Ultimately, justice cannot be measured in identical dollar amounts.  A sanctions system committed to equal rights should deter consistently, punish proportionately, and refuse to treat poverty as a second offense.  The core reform is to replace flat-dollar fines with proportional penalties that scale to capacity so equal wrongdoing carries equal penal significance rather than equal dollars.  Within that framework, the system should prevent affluent offenders from treating fines as routine costs by strengthening collection tools and by triggering escalating nonmonetary consequences when violations are repeated.  At the same time, it should protect indigent defendants through presumptive indigency rules and waiver or diversion options, so deterrence does not depend on unpayable debt.  Without this recalibration, court debt will continue to convert minor violations into long-term instability for low-income people while leaving the wealthy effectively insulated from meaningful deterrence.

^[1] Lindsay Bing, Becky Pettit & Ilya Slavinski, Incomparable Punishments: How Economic Inequality Contributes to the Disparate Impact of Legal Fines and Fees, 8 RSF: Tʜᴇ Rᴜssᴇʟʟ Sᴀɢᴇ Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. J. Sᴏᴄ. Sᴄɪ. 118 (2022).

^[2] Caroline Greer, States Need to Reform Criminal Justice Fines and Fees: The Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Fines and Fees Create a Cycle of Punishment, Rᴇᴀsᴏɴ Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. (July 2, 2021), https://reason.org/commentary/states-need-to-reform-criminal-justice-fines-and-fees/[https://perma.cc/ZXC3-44KZ].

^[3]Oғғɪᴄᴇ ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ N.Y.C. Cᴏᴍᴘᴛʀᴏʟʟᴇʀ, Fees, Fines and Fairness: How Monetary Charges Drive Inequity in New York City’s Criminal Justice System 8 (Sep. 2019).

^[4] Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. Cʜɪ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1869, 1877–80 (2018).

^[5] Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664–65 (1983) (holding that a court may not revoke probation and imprison someone for failure to pay absent findings regarding responsibility for nonpayment and the adequacy of alternatives).

^[6] Id. at 672.

^[7] Id. at 672–73.

^[8] Id.

^[9] Antonya Jeffrey, How Government Reliance on Fines and Fees Harms Communities Across the United States, Wᴀsʜ. Cᴛʀ. ғᴏʀ Eᴏ̨ᴜɪᴛᴀʙʟᴇ Gʀᴏᴡᴛʜ (Apr. 25,  2023), https://equitablegrowth.org/how-government-reliance-on-fines-and-fees-harms-communities-across-the-united-states/[https://perma.cc/7R66-VS9X] (explaining how fines plus added fees/surcharges can impose substantially greater burdens on low-income people.)

^[10] Id.

^[11] Maria Rafael, The Burden of Court Debt on Washingtonians, Vera Inst. of Just. (Jan. 2023); Oғғ. ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ N.Y.C. Cᴏᴍᴘᴛʀᴏʟʟᴇʀ, supra note 3.

^[12] Jeffrey, supra note 9.

^[13] Daniella Genovese, Bezos Racks Up $16,800 in Parking Fines During DC Castle Renovation, Fᴏx Bᴜs. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/jeff-bezos-parking-fines-dc-mansion-renovation [https://perma.cc/9MGZ-KZR3]; Ashley Carman, Jeff Bezos Paid More than $16,000 in Parking Tickets While Renovating His DC Mansion, Tʜᴇ Vᴇʀɢᴇ (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/3/21120476/jeff-bezos-washington-dc-renovate-apartment-home-parking-tickets [https://perma.cc/4USY-NWKZ].

^[14] Nathan Atkinson, Profiting from Pollution, 41 Yᴀʟᴇ J. ᴏɴ Rᴇɢᴜʟ. Bᴜʟʟ. 1, 1–3 (2023).

^[15] Id.; Sebastian Rowland, Environmental Enforcement: More Than Just a Cost of Doing Business, Tʜᴇ Rᴇɢᴜʟ. Rᴇᴠ. (Jan. 2, 2012),

https://www.theregreview.org/2012/01/02/environmental-enforcement-more-than-just-a-cost-of-doing-business/ [https://perma.cc/8E8L-SH67].

^[16] Atkinson, supra note 14.

^[17] Rowland, supra note 15.

^[18] W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, U.S. Sᴍᴀʟʟ Bᴜs. Aᴅᴍɪɴ., Oғғ. ᴏғ Aᴅᴠᴏᴄᴀᴄʏ (Sept. 2005), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-SBA-PURL-LPS95767/pdf/GOVPUB-SBA-PURL-LPS95767.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5C2-KWNW].

^[19] Bing et al., supra note 1, at 119–20; Atkinson, supra note 14, at 2.

^[20] Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. Cʜɪ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1869, 1870 (2018).

^[21] Judith Greene, The Staten Island Day Fine Experiment, Vᴇʀᴀ Iɴsᴛ. ᴏғ Jᴜsᴛ. (Aug. 1990).

^[22] Schierenbeck, supra note 20, at 1876–79.

^[23] Laura A. Winterfield & Sally T. Hillsman, The Effects of Instituting Means-Based Fines in a Criminal Court: The Staten Island Day-Fine Experiment, Vᴇʀᴀ Iɴsᴛ. ᴏғ Jᴜsᴛ. (Sept. 1991); Douglas C. McDonald, Judith A. Greene & Charles Worzella, Day Fines in American Courts: The Staten Island and Milwaukee Experiments, Nᴀᴛ'ʟ Iɴsᴛ. Jᴜsᴛ. (1992).

^[24] Greene, supra note 21.

^[25] Id.

^[26] Ali Bauman, New York City Council introduces bill requiring richer people to pay more for violations like parking tickets, double parking, CBS Nᴇᴡs (Apr. 27, 2023), https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/city-council-bill-introduced-that-would-require-wealthy-to-pay-more-for-violations-like-parking-tickets-double-parking/ [https://perma.cc/8DSG-TCUJ]; N.Y. Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ Uɴɪғɪᴇᴅ Cᴛ. Sʏs., Monthly Installment Payment Plans for Vehicle & Traffic Offenses (June 22, 2021), https://www.nycourts.gov/law/VTL/ [https://perma.cc/83P6-YGXR].

^[27]  N.Y. Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ Uɴɪғɪᴇᴅ Cᴛ. Sʏs., supra note 26.

^[28] N.Y. Dᴇᴘ'ᴛ ᴏғ Mᴏᴛᴏʀ Vᴇʜɪᴄʟᴇs, Traffic Ticket Payment Plans, https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/payment-plans [https://perma.cc/4W4A-LJ93].

^[29] Bauman, supra note 26.

^[30] N.Y. Dᴇᴘ'ᴛ ᴏғ Mᴏᴛᴏʀ Vᴇʜɪᴄʟᴇs, supra note 28.

^[31] Bauman, supra note 26.

^[32] Lauren Jones, Ability to Pay: Closing the Access to Justice Gap with Policy Solutions for Unaffordable Fines and Fees, 51 Fᴏʀᴅʜᴀᴍ Uʀʙ. L.J. 1593, 1625–27 (2024); Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. Cʜɪ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1869, 1909 (2018).

^[33] Jones, supra note 32, at 1629.

^[34] Id. at 1607, 1610–11, 1620.

^[35] Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662–63 (1983).